“‘Made in China’ . . . Is a Warning
Label”1: Is America Doing Enough?
Devin Kathleen Epp*
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 708
I. BACKGROUND: XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION ............ 709
II. THE WORLD RESPONDS TO CULTURAL GENOCIDE.......................... 713
A. Congress Takes Action ................................................................715
B. U.S. Federal Agencies Take Action .............................................718
1. U.S. Department of State.......................................................... 719
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security................................... 721
3. U.S. Department of Commerce ................................................ 723
4. U.S. Department of Treasury ................................................... 724
5. U.S. Department of Labor ........................................................ 726
III. TIME TO PRESSURE CHINA .............................................................. 727
A. Multilateral Efforts ......................................................................727
1. The World Platform ................................................................. 727
2. U.S.–EU Coordination ............................................................. 729
B. Secondary Sanctions ....................................................................731
1. Maximum Pressure Campaign ................................................. 734
2. Secondary Sanction Effects ...................................................... 735
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 738

* J.D. Candidate Class of 2022, Seattle University School of Law.
1. CBP Issues Detention Order on Cotton Products Made by Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps Using Prison Labor, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Dec. 2, 2020),
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INTRODUCTION
Today, China and the United States (U.S.) are two economic world
powers that significantly influence global trade.2 China’s economic status
and coercive tactics create challenging barriers for nations to condemn
China’s repressive actions against the Uyghur population. Yet, roughly
two thousand years ago, in a continent far away from Asia, the Stoic
philosopher Seneca wrote words relating to the human condition that
sound all too relevant to today’s diplomatic fray between China and the
U.S.: “Even Socrates, Cato, and Laelius might have been shaken in their
moral strength by a crowd that was unlike them; so true it is that none of
us, no matter how much he cultivates his abilities, can withstand [the
influence of their surroundings].”3 The prophetic message warns, “The
offer to work for some notoriously bad boss, to make a boatload of money
in a sketchy industry, to serve in some compromised administration: it will
not end well. It must be turned down—it is the call of a siren. It will wreck
you!”4 The U.S. cannot work with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
which governs the People’s Republic of China (PRC), when it knowingly
initiated a self-serving genocide—the “compromised administration.” The
U.S. cannot empower China’s trade industry that funds human rights
violations—the “sketchy industry.” The U.S. cannot continue to import
Chinese products manufactured by forced labor—the “notoriously bad”
state entity. As a world power, the U.S.’ inability to curb human rights
violations in China must be addressed. Cultural genocide is a greater and
more material interest than the interests of trade, market, and investments
in China. The U.S. can hold China accountable, but it needs to lead the
world through stronger diplomatic mechanisms and reform its sanction
framework.
Part I discusses the background and human rights violations in
Xinjiang, also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). Part II addresses U.S. economic regulations and sanctions
imposed against actors involved in Xinjiang’s forced labor industry. Part
III analyzes previous U.S. strategies and sanction regimes implemented to
combat human rights violations in other countries. This Note recommends
that the U.S. implement a more robust multilateral framework to combat
2. See, e.g., Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis, Combatting Human Rights Abuses in
Xinjiang, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INTL’L STUD., https://www.csis.org/features/combatting-humanrights-abuses-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/38EZ-D3H4] [hereinafter Combatting Human Rights Abuses]
(“[China is the] world’s largest producer and exporter of yarn, textiles, and apparel.”); Economy &
Trade, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/economy-trade
[https://perma.cc/WKC5-PR9D].
3. Who You Spend Time with Matters, DAILY STOIC (Dec. 2, 2020), https://dailystoic.com/whoyou-spend-time-with-matters/ [https://perma.cc/FCK2-27S2] [hereinafter DAILY STOIC].
4. Id.
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the Xinjiang cultural genocide and impose secondary sanctions against
China and entities involved in forced labor in Xinjiang.
I. BACKGROUND: XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION
Xinjiang is an important economic and political region in China. It is
a province four times the size of Germany in China’s northwest region.5
China’s financial goals largely depend on Xinjiang’s trade production for
the following key reasons: (1) Xinjiang plays a crucial role in China’s
economy as one of the world’s largest cotton producers,6 which accounts
for 20% of the world’s cotton7 and about 85% of China’s cotton
production8—it is a multi-billion-dollar production of goods;9 (2)
Xinjiang’s location is a valuable resource to China’s economy because it
sits on a designated “special economic zone”10 due to its richness in fossil
fuels, oil, minerals, copper, and coal11 and is China’s largest natural gas
producer;12 and (3) Xinjiang’s economic importance only amplifies as
China’s multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road initiative (One Belt One
Road)—a project that spans over sixty countries—will run through

5. See Shrey Verma, The Echo of Uyghurs—Voices Stifled by an Authoritarian Regime, HUM.
RTS. PULSE (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/the-echo-ofuyghursvoices-stifled-by-an-authoritarian-regime [https://perma.cc/C3BL-KXXX]; see also Brennan
Davis, Being Uighur . . . with “Chinese Characteristics”: Analyzing China’s Legal Crusade Against
Uighur Identity, 44 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 81, 88 (2019) (bordering Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir).
6. AMY LEHR, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., ADDRESSING FORCED LABOR IN THE
XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION: TOWARD A SHARED AGENDA 4–5 (2020) [hereinafter
FORCED LABOR REPORT] (XUAR produces “a desirable source of cotton” known for its “consistent
quality.”).
7. ADRIAN ZENZ, CTR. FOR GLOB. POL’Y, COERCIVE LABOR IN XINJIANG: LABOR TRANSFER
AND THE MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES TO PICK COTTON 2–3 (2020) [hereinafter COERCIVE
LABOR] (“Uyghur-majority regions . . . grow much of the region’s hand-picked cotton . . . also
produce nearly all of the highest-quality long-staple cotton . . . .”). See generally AMY K. LEHR &
MARIEFAYE BECHRAKIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., CONNECTING THE DOTS IN XINJIANG
FORCED LABOR, FORCED ASSIMILATION, AND WESTERN SUPPLY CHAINS (2019) [hereinafter
CONNECTING THE DOTS] (stating more than thirty percent of U.S. apparel imports come from China).
8. GRAHAM SOLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., CH19052, CHINA – PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF COTTON AND PRODUCTS UPDATE ECONOMIC HEADWINDS STYMIE COTTON USE (2019).
9. China Slams Canada After Report Calls Uighur Policy ‘Genocide’, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 11,
2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/22/china-rejects-canada-report-accusing-beijing-ofuighur-genocide [https://perma.cc/7EWY-XM57] [hereinafter Policy Report].
10. Bryan Wood, What is Happening with the Uighurs in China?, PBS NEWS HOUR,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/features/uighurs/ [https://perma.cc/E8B7-E4UD].
11. Lily Kuo, Guardian News, Why More Than a Million Uighers are Being Held in Camps in
China, YOUTUBE (July 24, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKpyaDZkNfU
[https://perma.cc/823B-7KMD].
12. Wood, supra note 10.
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Xinjiang and connect China with Africa and Europe, which will greatly
expand China’s economic influence.13
The CCP, the founding and ruling political party—China’s
government—asserted its control over Xinjiang’s Uyghur population after
the establishment of the PRC in Beijing in 1949.14 The Xinjiang’s Uyghur
population is a Turkic Muslim minority group.15 The CCP seeks to
cultivate Xinjiang into its Chinese society by “integrat[ing] the Uyghur
homeland into a more homogeneous” 16 and Han-centric state.17 China’s
President, Xi Jinping, called for an “ideological cure, an effort to rewire
the thinking of the [Xinjiang] region’s Muslim minorities.”18 To advance
its Han-centric society, the CCP used the “Global War on Terror”
(GWOT) to create a counterterrorism narrative as a victim of the GWOT.19
China deflected international criticism alleging that the Uyghurs pose a
terrorist threat20 in an attempt to justify its actions.21 Consequently, over
the past several decades, the CCP established its regime in Xinjiang to

13. See Policy Report, supra note 9; see, e.g., The Economist, How China is Crushing the
Uighurs, YOUTUBE (July 9, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRBcP5BrffI
[https://perma.cc/8EX7-FMKY].
14. E.g., Explore Map Feature from The Xinjiang Data Project, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POL’Y
INST., https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/? [https://perma.cc/7KJZ-Y6A2] [hereinafter Xinjiang Data
Project]; see, e.g., Brian Yeh, Self-Determination for Some: The Palestinians and the Uyghurs in
China’s Foreign Policy, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1137, 1161(2020).
15 See, e.g., The Chinese Communist Party’s Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html [https://perma.cc/2WZW-75B4] [hereinafter CCP
Human Rights Abuses].
16. SEAN R. ROBERTS, THE WAR ON THE UYGHURS: CHINA’S INTERNAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST A
MUSLIM MINORITY 236–37 (2020) (“[T]he primary driver of this state-led cultural genocide is the
settler colonization of the Uyghur homeland . . . . [China] poured billions of dollars into the region’s
development . . . and an ever -increasing securitization.”).
17. See generally Susan K. McCarthy, A New Era of Development?: The State, Minorities, and
Dilemmas of Development in Contemporary China, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFS. 107 (2002)
(discussing China’s large-scale economic modernization projects of Han resettlement to ethnic
minority regions that “alter the socio-economic patterns and cultural practices of the minority residents
of those regions”).
18. Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China
Organized
Mass
Detentions
of
Muslims,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiangdocuments.html [https://perma.cc/NNV3-2KUB] [hereinafter Absolutely No Mercy].
19. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 244–45 (“[T]he narrative of GWOT is now evolving
into . . . settler colonization, ethnic cleansing, and cultural genocide. This was the case with the
Rohingya in Myanmar . . . Uyghurs in China; and it may be evolving . . . for Kashmiris in India.”).
See generally How China is Crushing the Uighurs, supra note 13 (discussing Uyghur terrorist attacks
that fueled CCP’s hostility and arguing that China used GWOT to heighten domestic security, which
tripled its security budget in Xinjiang).
20. See, e.g., Absolutely No Mercy, supra note 18 (quoting President Xi Jinping’s dictatorship
response as a “struggle against terrorism, infiltration[,] and separatism”).
21. ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 200; see, e.g., GARDNER BOVINGDON, THE UYGHURS:
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND 4, 5 (paperback ed. 2020).

2022]

"Made in China" Is a Warning Label

711

systemically destroy22 the Uyghur population and traditionally Muslim
groups.23
The CCP’s regime ties the U.S.’ economic trade forum to cultural
genocide. The CCP’s “unified and systematic” campaign24 now controls
the Uyghur population—subjecting them to forced labor, among other
human rights violations.25 The CCP regime includes a massive
overarching surveillance system26 that collects a breadth of data27 such as
biometric information.28 The high-tech surveillance cameras29 include
facial recognition systems that can purportedly distinguish Uyghurs and
Tibetans from other ethnic groups.30 Additionally, the CCP has enacted
22. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16 at 199. See Timothy Grose, How the CCP Took over the Most
Sacred of Uighur Rituals, CHINAFILE (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.chinafile.com/reportingopinion/viewpoint/how-ccp-took-over-most-sacred-of-uighur-rituals
[https://perma.cc/S3JKLWRB], for a discussion on CCP’s suppression of Uyghur identity.
23. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. E909 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2020) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee)
(“[F]or years, the Chinese government has engaged in a systematic campaign of repression targeting
Uyghurs and other Muslim groups. Chinese authorities have used the pretext of terrorism to suspend
the Uyghurs’ civil and political rights and pursue the internment of Uyghurs in ‘educational training
centers’ . . . satellite imagery, leaked [Chinese] official documents . . . testimony of camp
survivors . . . confirmed a widespread and pervasive forced labor system . . . .”).
24. ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 208.
25. See, e.g., Natasha Parassram Concepcion, Human Rights Violations Against Muslims in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of Western China, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF l9 (2000).
26. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 202–03; Michael Posner, Why U.S. Investors in Chinese
Companies Need to Consider the Human Rights Risks, FORBES (July 14, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2021/07/14/why-us-investors-in-chinese-companiesneed-to-consider-the-human-rights-risks/?sh=bd21d0c3840f [https://perma.cc/S733-DBMR] (“The
Chinese government has installed more than 200 million surveillance cameras across the country and
applied their most draconian monitoring efforts against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.”). See John Wagner
Givens & Debra Lam, Smarter Cities or Bigger Brother? How the Race for Smart Cities Could
Determine the Future of China, Democracy, and Privacy, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 829, 859 (2020),
for a discussion of the mass surveillance system controlling the Xinjiang population.
27. See DOMINIC J. NARDI, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
IN CHINA’S HIGH-TECH SURVEILLANCE STATE (2019) (reporting several members of Congress calling
for greater restrictions on advanced technology exports to China in response to high-surveillance
developments).
28. E.g., id. (including voice recordings, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types); see, e.g.,
Givens & Lam, supra note 26, at 859–60 (“[I]nformation collected includes height, religious dress,
beard length, electricity and gas usage, package deliveries, use of a home’s back versus the front door,
movements around cities . . . police records, addresses, vehicle registration . . . details on trips
abroad.”).
29. E.g., NARDI, supra note 27; see, e.g., Givens & Lam, supra note 26, at 860 (reporting that
identification checkpoints are equipped with “machines that detect and log the MAC addresses and
IMEI numbers of any phones that pass through the checkpoint” that are often in conjunction with
facial recognition); COERCIVE LABOR, supra note 7, at 14 (“[V]illage-based work teams . . . became a
key component in the seamless integration of social control and securitization, linking household
information with data from surveillance systems and the entire police state.”).
30. E.g., NARDI, supra note 27 (reporting CCP targets religious communities with “advanced
computing platforms and artificial intelligence to collate and recognize patterns in the data” including
surveillance outside and inside worship centers to identify attendees).

712

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:707

methodology for “transforming”31 and “cleansing” the population32
through mass internment.33 The CCP also imposes discriminatory laws34
and actions against the Uyghur population35 to ensure the alleged
extremism does not spread to others.36 In Xinjiang, approximately 3
million people37 were detained in “an expanded system of extrajudicial
mass internment camps” that tortured subjected detainees in 2019,38 in
addition to thousands of secondary students forced to pick cotton.39 It is
evident that cultural genocide is happening in Xinjiang.40

31. See, e.g., COERCIVE LABOR, supra note 7, at 19 (“[C]otton pickers . . . must eat, live, study
and work with them [CCP officials], vigorously implementing thought education . . . .”); FORCED
LABOR REPORT, supra note 6.
32. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 203.
33. See Hailey Konnath, House Oks Bill Barring Chinese Imports Over Forced Labor, LAW360
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1312207/house-oks-bill-barring-chinese-importsover-forced-labor [https://perma.cc/P9LY-STGW] (reporting by 2017, CCP held more than one
million Muslims in government detentions). See generally BUREAU OF CONFLICT & STABILIZATION
OPERATIONS, 2020 REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE ELIE WIESEL GENOCIDE
AND ATROCITIES PREVENTION ACT OF 2018 (P.L. 115-441) (2020) [hereinafter CONFLICT &
STABILIZATION REPORT] (reporting that inside the detention centers, abuses include violations of
religious freedom; involuntary birth control; family separation by taking children from their parents;
physical and sexual abuse; forced abortion; forced labor; forced sterilization; and arbitrary detention.).
34. E.g., Xinjiang Data Project, supra note 14 (reporting party officials in Xinjiang banned
twenty-three (later expanded to seventy-five) “illegal religious activities,” including any uses of
religion to influence social order or damage national interest); Wood, supra note 10 (reporting PRC
passed a law in Xinjiang prohibiting men from growing long beards and women from wearing veils).
35. See, e.g., Chris Buckley & Austin Ramzy, China Is Erasing Mosques and Precious Shrines
in Xinjiang, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/25/
world/asia/xinjiang-china-religious-site.html [https://perma.cc/84SC-2LXY] (estimating more than a
third of the mosques in the Xinjiang region have been completely demolished since 2017).
36. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 203. In 2005, police arrested a religious teacher and
thirty-seven students for studying the Qur’an in private. BOVINGDON, supra note 21, at 72.
37. 166 CONG. REC. 4,662 (2020); see, e.g., CCP Human Rights Abuses, supra note 15. See
generally Mehmet Volkan Kaşıkçı, Documenting the Tragedy in Xinjiang: An Insider’s View of
Atajurt, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 16, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/documenting-the-tragedy-inxinjiang-an-insiders-view-of-atajurt/ [https://perma.cc/3JSM-42EB] (“The Atajurt Kazakh Human
Rights Organization has provided enormous amount of information about the Chinese concentration
camps and the dystopian regime in Xinjiang.”)”.
38. REP. JAMES P. MCGOVERN & SEN. MARCO RUBIO, CONG.–EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 2019
ANNUAL REPORT (2019). Abuses such as “beatings; electric shocks; waterboarding; medical neglect;
forced ingestion of medication; sleep deprivation; extended solitary confinement; and handcuffing or
shackling for prolonged periods, as well as restricted access to toilet facilities; punishment for behavior
deemed religious; forced labor; overcrowding; deprivation of food; and political indoctrination.”
Conditions and medical neglect have led to detainees dying in the camps. Id. at 15, 263.
39. COERCIVE LABOR, supra note 7, at 4.
40. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 200.
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II. THE WORLD RESPONDS TO CULTURAL GENOCIDE
The U.S.,41 other democratic countries,42 and world leaders43 deem
China’s treatment of the Uyghurs cultural genocide. 44 Yet the CCP
continues to commit human rights abuses45 and pressure other nations to
turn a blind eye.46
Due to China’s powerful regime, its coercive tactics create
significant barriers to stop human rights violations and prevent
transparency for the global trade industry. The CCP claims that the human
rights violation reports are baseless47 and such allegations are
“unacceptable.”48 However, after satellite imagery exposed the detention

41. E.g., CONFLICT & STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 33 (“U.S. government also signed an
unprecedented joint statement with [twenty-three] nations, calling attention to the situation in Xinjiang
and urging China to demonstrate respect for the rights of members of ethnic and religious minority
groups.”).
42. Australia, Canada, and Japan are among several democracies to voice concerns. Steven
Chase & Robert Fife, Parliamentary Committee Calls China’s Mistreatment of Uyghurs ‘Genocide,’
Urges Ottawa To Sanction Beijing Officials, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-parliamentary-committee-calls-chinasmistreatment-of-uyghurs/ [https://perma.cc/L3CE-6PBD].
43. E.g., POPE FRANCIS, LET US DREAM: THE PATH TO A BETTER FUTURE 12 (2020) (calling
Uyghurs “persecuted” people); Asim Kashgarian, Activists, Experts Call on UN to Recognize China’s
Uighur ‘Genocide,’ VOA NEWS (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voanews-china/activists-experts-call-un-recognize-chinas-uighur-genocide
[https://perma.cc/6LD5Q8VL].
44. E.g., Edward Wong & Chris Buckley, U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is
‘Genocide,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trumpchinaxinjiang.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/M2NK3UCZ]; Chase & Fife, supra note 42; China Suppression of Uighur Minorities Meets U.N. Definition
of Genocide, Report Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 4, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify).
45. See ADRIAN ZENZ, JAMESTOWN FOUND., STERILIZATIONS, IUDS, AND MANDATORY BIRTH
CONTROL: THE CCP’S CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS UYGHUR BIRTHRATES IN XINJIANG (2020), for a
report on the significant Uyghur population decline—eighty-four percent decline between 2015 and
2018 in the largest Uyghur jurisdictions.
46. Aryeh Neier, Opinion: China Bullies the World to Look the Other Way on Human-Rights
Abuses, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-bullies-theworld-to-look-the-other-way-on-human-rights-abuses-2020-02-05 [https://perma.cc/V9Z8-CQSQ].
47. E.g., China Dismisses Pope Francis’s Comments about Persecution of Uighers, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/china-dismisses-pope-francisscomments-about-persecution-of-uighurs [https://perma.cc/YQX2-GUPB] (quoting a Chinese foreign
ministry spokesperson, “[p]eople of all ethnic groups enjoy the full rights of survival, development,
and freedom of religious belief”).
48. UN Demands ‘Unfettered Access’ for China Uighur Region Visit, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/27/un-demands-unfettered-access-for-china-uighurregion-visit [https://perma.cc/G97Q-EV26]; see Reuters Staff, China Says It Welcomes U.N. to Visit
Xinjiang Via Proper Procedures, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaxinjiang/china-says-it-welcomes-u-n-to-visit-xinjiang-via-proper-procedures-idUSKCN1P10IG
[https://perma.cc/RYU4-DRS2] (“Beijing has launched an increasingly active publicity campaign to
defend its actions in Xinjiang . . . .”).
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camps,49 the CCP finally acknowledged the centers50 but referred to them
as “vocational camps.”51 Nevertheless, China continuously employs
deceptive tactics to keep its abuses undisclosed and justified.52 The CCP
punishes anyone against its regime, including legal activists and human
rights lawyers, for “organizing political challenges,”53 and even the CCP
officials for “gravely disobeying” the CCP’s protocol for governing
Xinjiang.54 In June 2021, Canada’s ambassador to the United Nations
(UN) addressed the UN Human Rights Council on behalf of forty-four
countries voicing their grave concerns about human rights abuses in
Xinjiang and urging China to allow “immediate, meaningful[,] and
unfettered access to Xinjiang.”55 China’s refusal to allow media,56 foreign

49. NATHAN RUSER, INT’L CYBER POL’Y CTR., DOCUMENTING XINJIANG’S DETENTION
SYSTEM 4 (2020) (mapping over 380 sites across Xinjiang and reporting at least sixty-one detention
sites have seen construction and expansion between July 2019 and July 2020—with at least fourteen
still under construction in 2020—and half of these new sites are “higher security facilities”); see also
Julia Wokaty, Human Rights Groups Call on U.S. for Regional Ban on Imports from China Made with
Uyghur Forced Labor, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP. (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.iccr.org/human-rights-groups-call-us-regional-ban-imports-china-made-uyghur-forcedlabor [https://perma.cc/5BXD-ELZ3] (“The large-scale forced-labor program is a core part of the
government’s plan for control and surveillance of Uyghurs.”).
50. Sigal Samuel, Internet Sleuths Are Hunting for China’s Secret Internment Camps for
Muslims, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/
china-internment-camps-muslim-uighurs-satellite/569878/ [https://perma.cc/R4DA-CFHM] (“China
has denied that it aims to indoctrinate Muslims in the camps, telling a UN panel . . . ’there is no such
thing as reeducation centers’ . . . . The country now claims the camps are just vocational schools for
criminals . . . .”) (emphasis added); e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 214.
51. E.g., Geneva Sands & Ben Westcott, Trump Administration Blocks Some Xinjiang Goods
from China Suspected of Being Made with Slave Labor, CNN (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/14/politics/us-xinjiang-cotton-imports-intl-hnk/index.html
[https://perma.cc/E8L2-GWJX] (describing camps “as voluntary and part of a wide-reaching
deradicalization campaign”).
52. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 10.
53. Javier C. Hernández, Chinese Rights Lawyer Swept Up in Xi’s Crackdown Gets More Than
4 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/world/asia/chi
na-wang-quanzhang-human-rights.html [https://perma.cc/N2UZ-T6UA] (“The government has
continued its campaign . . . disbarring lawyers who take on cases the [CCP] party sees as a threat and
keeping others under surveillance.”).
54. Absolutely No Mercy, supra note 18. Thousands of Xinjiang officials were punished for
“failing to carry out the crackdown with sufficient zeal.” Id. One official was stripped of his power
because he released more than seven thousand inmates from an internment camp; another Han leader
in Xinjiang was jailed for “trying to slow the detentions and shield Uighur officials.” Id.
55. U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORGS. IN GENEVA, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN XINJIANG (June 22, 2021), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2021/06/22/joint-statementon-the-human-rights-situation-in-xinjiang/ [https://perma.cc/8JS6-VMPT].
56. ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 238 (“[J]ournalists were allowed to interview a few hand-picked
released ‘graduates’ from the camps . . . ’graduates’ . . . were visibly terrified to misspeak.”).
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officials,57 and the UN58 unfettered access59 to Xinjiang prevents U.S.
companies from investigating its supply chain and performing legitimate
audits in Xinjiang—only allowing those companies to see what China
wants them to see.60
The U.S. must do more: it must lead strategic multilateral
engagements and impose harsher sanctions to pressure China to end its
human rights abuses.61 The unilateral actions and strategies Congress and
U.S. federal agencies have taken62 are not enough to combat China’s
cultural genocide.
A. Congress Takes Action
Members of Congress from across the political spectrum share the
common goal of stopping China’s human rights abuses.63 In 2017, a
bipartisan group from both houses of Congress urged federal agencies to
impose Global Magnitsky Act64 (Magnitsky Act) sanctions on Chinese
authorities for their role in China’s human rights abuses.65 The Magnitsky
57. See Margaret K. Lewis, Why China Should Unsign the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 131, 175 (2020) (discussing China’s failure to meet
minimal obligations as a member of the UN Human Rights Council).
58. E.g., Reuters Staff, supra note 48; Ayat G. Hamza, Bolstering the Role of U.N. Treaty
Bodies: A Possible Solution to the Chinese Uighur Crisis with Potentially Far-Reaching Implications,
46 N.C. J. INT’L L. 505, 527 (2021) (“Over the last decade, [China] has not been receptive to visits by
U.N. human rights personnel like the High Commissioner for Human Rights, preferring to limit its
approval to only those visits that would result in positive reviews.”).
59. Yu-Jie Chen, China’s Challenge to The International Human Rights Regime, 51 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1179, 1204 (2019).
60. Ana Swanson, U.S. Restricts Chinese Apparel and Tech Products, Citing Forced Labor,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/business/economy/us-chinaforced-labor-imports.html [https://perma.cc/3QHS-M77D].
61. See George A. Lopez, Enforcing Human Rights Through Economic Sanctions, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INT’L HUM. RTS. L. 772, 792 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013) (“Short of military force,
economic sanctions are the only major tool available to national leaders and multilateral institutions
that will produce results essential to ending harsh repression and human rights abuses.”).
62. See generally Rebecca Stark, China’s Use of Artificial Intelligence in Their War Against
Xinjiang, 29 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 153, 170–72 (2021) (discussing recent actions U.S.
government has taken to condemn CCP).
63. E.g., 166 CONG. REC. H4666 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2020).
64. See generally, e.g., DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE GLOBAL MAGNITSKY
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (2020) (explaining history and purpose); Global Magnitsky
Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/global-magnitsky-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/YF49-N4YQ] (providing information on sanctions framework); Global Magnitsky
Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/global-magnitsky-act/ [https://perma.cc/E8C3R7BP] (listing infographics, releases, and executive order).
65. Tal Axelrod, Bipartisan Lawmakers Call for Sanctions Against China Over Human Rights
Concerns, THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/437419-bipartisanlegislators-call-for-sanctions-against-china-over-human [https://perma.cc/6CPW-EM92] (reporting a
forty-three-member bipartisan group, twenty-four senators and nineteen representatives, sent a letter
to Secretary of State, Treasury Secretary, and Commerce Secretary).
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Act sanctions hold individuals accountable for gross violations of human
rights and acts of significant corruption.66 Notably, the Magnitsky Act has
inspired other nations to take action and follow U.S. policy.67 Thus,
Congress has the platform to inspire and initiate global reform yet it is
falling short of effective action.
In 2020 and 2021, Congress drafted several bills regarding human
rights abuses in Xinjiang,68 but only two have been enacted into law: the
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Uyghur Act)69 and the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). The UFLPA expands on the
Uyghur Act and creates a rebuttable presumption that all goods
manufactured in Xinjiang are a product of forced labor.70 Although the
Uyghur Act and UFLPA Act are steps in the right direction, there are two
central problems.
First, these unilateral measures alone are not enough to alter China’s
behavior because of China’s dominance in trade. Consequently, the
products imported from China to the U.S. do not substantially impact
China’s economic market.71 China consumes most of its own final
products; roughly 88% of China’s apparel and textiles stay within its
borders.72 In some instances, the European Union (EU) is a larger

66. See 166 CONG. REC. S7,065 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2020) (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin)
(“[When a] country does not hold accountable those who violate basic global human rights of its
citizens; [the U.S.] impose[s] [Global Magnitsky] sanctions. Those sanctions prevent that individual
who perpetrated these acts from visiting the United States through the issuance of a visa or
participating in our banking system.”).
67. Id. Countries such as such as the UK, Canada, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enacted
similar bills to the U.S.’ Magnitsky Act, and Japan and Australia are currently considering similar
legislation. Id. In December 2020, the EU also adopted a “Global Human Rights sanctions framework
of its own.” Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, United States and Partners Promote Accountability
for Corruption and Human Rights Abuse, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.state.gov/united-states-and-partners-promote-accountability-for-corruption-and-humanrights-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/2JMM-M8Q9].
68. E.g., H.R. 6270, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring issuers of securities to publicly disclose their
activities related to Xinjiang); H.R.6210, 116th Cong. (2020) (imposing various restrictions related to
the Xinjiang region, including prohibition of certain Xinjiang imports); S. 4241, 116th Cong. (2020)
(requiring publicly traded companies to disclose use of forced labor in their direct supply chain); S.
65, 117th Cong. (2021) (ensuring goods made with forced labor do not enter U.S. market). These bills
never passed during the 116th or 117th sessions.
69. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, 22 U.S.C. § 6901 (providing resources to combat
the Xinjiang human rights violations and allowing the President to impose sanctions on entities
deemed responsible for such abuses in Xinjiang).
70. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, Pub. L. No 117-78, 135 Stat. 1525 (2021) (requiring
“clear and convincing evidence” that products produced in XUAR are not tainted by forced labor,
effective June 2022).
71. See Combatting Human Rights Abuses, supra note 2 (“U.S. action will most likely not be
sufficient on its own to effect change.”).
72. Soumaya Keynes & Chad P. Brown, Xinjiang’s Forced Labor, Supply Chains, and Trade
Sanctions, TRADE TALKS (Dec. 2, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify).
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consumer of these products.73 Another hurdle that prevents success to
these Acts is China’s blatant disregard for democratic values, as China
enacted statutes for “Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial
Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures” that authorize
countersanctions and civil liability for Chinese nationals who comply with
attempts to enforce foreign laws in China.74 Due to the U.S.’ nominal
impact on China’s economy from Chinese imported goods and China’s
aggressive and hostile stance, Congress must engage in multilateral
strategies to disrupt China’s economy to stop the CCP’s repression in
Xinjiang.75
Second, there is growing speculation that Congress’s actions are
making a difference.76 Congress enacted two bills to stop China from
committing genocide in Xinjiang, but the U.S. decided to participate in the
2022 Beijing Winter Olympics (Beijing Olympics) in China.77 Congress
is sending a mixed message: the U.S. will denounce the CCP’s treatment
of the Uyghurs but participate in the Beijing Olympics where the CCP is
committing genocide. It is no coincidence that there is strong financial
incentive to participate in the Olympics as “[m]any of the companies
sponsoring the [Beijing Olympics] Games also spent directly on lobbying
and influence operations as part of efforts to further their agendas in
Washington.”78 Although the U.S. refused to send diplomatic or official
representation:
The President has once again opted for a half measure, when bold
leadership was required. The United States should fully boycott the
Genocide Games in Beijing. American businesses should not
financially support the Chinese Communist Party and we must not
73. Combatting Human Rights Abuses, supra note 2.
74. See MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021 on Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial
Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, People’s Republic of China Ministry of
Commerce (Jan. 9, 2021), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/announcement/202101/
20210103029708.shtml [https://perma.cc/28KW-XPM7].
75. See infra Section III.A.2.
76. See Beijing’s Genocide Olympics, HONESTLY WITH BARI WEISS (Feb. 16, 2021)
(downloaded using Spotify) [hereinafter Genocide Olympics] (arguing Uyghur Act does not make a
difference, “it does not spend a dollar, does not spend a one red cent . . . the point is that a lot of
politicians saying the right things, not a lot of politicians getting together to use their power and
influence to stand up for the suffering, to raise the pressure”).
77. Press Briefing, Jen Psaki, Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki (Dec.
6, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/12/06/press-briefing-bypress-secretary-jen-psaki-december-6-2021/ [https://perma.cc/9FHR-FJ6V].
78. Anna Massoglia, Beijing Winter Olympics’ Corporate Sponsors are Also Big Lobbying
Spenders, OPEN SECRETS (Feb. 3, 2022) https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/02/beijing-winterolympics-corporate-sponsors-are-also-big-lobbying-spenders/ [https://perma.cc/F9AN-VL99] (In
2021, “Toyota and its subsidiaries spent more [money] on lobbying . . . than any other 2022 Olympic
partner . . . . [spending] more than $6.2 million. . . . Toyota paid for lobbying on a wide array of
issues” such as trade, tax credits, and infrastructure.); see e.g., Genocide Olympics, supra note 76.
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expose Team USA to the dangers of a repugnant authoritarian regime
that disappears its own athletes.79

The decision to participate, despite a diplomatic boycott, “is a real
gut punch to activists.”80 As Congressman Michael McCaul stated: “We
have a moral duty today to speak out against these horrifying crimes
against humanity and against the Uyghurs . . . . But we have an even
greater duty to avoid funding this genocide by paying for slave labor in
Xinjiang.”81 Congressmembers must uphold their stance against genocide,
maintain a global conversation, and enforce legitimate action despite any
political agenda.
B. U.S. Federal Agencies Take Action
The U.S. imposes sanctions as a means to justify the ends, usually to
alter behavior and invoke change. Since 2019, several U.S. government
agencies have responded to China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang,82
particularly by imposing primary sanctions.83 Generally, sanctions include
economic measures such as “trade embargoes; restrictions on exports from
or imports to the American market; cessation of aid to foreign countries,
loans, and foreign direct investment; and control (i.e., freezing) of foreign
assets and economic transactions that involve American citizens or
businesses.”84 Other sanctions limit China’s access to the U.S. financial
system by “limiting or prohibiting transactions involving U.S. individuals
and businesses; restricting private and government loans, investments,

79. Press Release, Tom Cotton, Senator, Cotton Statement on Diplomatic Boycott of the 2022
Winter Olympics (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cottonstatement-on-diplomatic-boycott-of-the-2022-winter-olympics [https://perma.cc/W74G-8QFL].
80. Id. Contra, Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives, Pelosi Remarks
at Hearing on the Beijing Olympics and the Faces of Repression (Feb. 3, 2022),
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/2322-2 [https://perma.cc/YHF2-HVBU]. Speaker of the House,
Nancy Pelosi addressed the U.S. athletes warning them to not speak out against China’s regime
because China is “ruthless”—yet at the same time she preaches that “we cannot and will not be silent
on human rights in China.”.
81. 166 CONG. REC. H4666 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2020) (statement of Congressman
Michael McCaul).
82. See, e.g., CONFLICT & STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 33 (listing actions U.S. has taken
to strengthen its efforts to denounce atrocities in Xinjiang and promote accountability for the CCP).
83. See generally Daniel Meagher, Note, Caught in the Economic Crosshairs: Secondary
Sanctions, Blocking Regulations, and the American Sanctions Regime, 89 FORDHAM L. R. 999, 1004
(2020) (“Primary sanctions prohibit companies and individuals in the sanctioning country from
engaging with their counterparts in the sanctioned country. These primary sanctions apply to persons,
transactions, and goods over which the sanctioning country can assert its jurisdiction.”).
84. Id. at 1004.
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insurance, and underwriting; and denying foreign assistance and
government procurement contracts.”85
The following agencies are taking action through unilateral
measures: the U.S. State Department (State Department); the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC); the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury); and the
U.S. Department of Labor. Each is addressed in turn.
1. U.S. Department of State
The State Department advises the President, leads the nation in
foreign policy issues, and has the authority to impose visa restrictions.86
The State Department has publicly criticized China’s behavior and
imposed several visa restrictions on millions of the CCP officials for their
responsibility or complicity in “the detention or abuse of
minority . . . Muslim groups in Xinjiang.”87 Then-Secretary Mike Pompeo
released several press statements calling for an immediate end to the
CCP’s repression.88 He urged all countries to join the U.S. “in condemning
85. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-324, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: TREASURY AND
STATE HAVE RECEIVED INCREASED RESOURCES FOR SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BUT FACE HIRING
CHALLENGES 4 (2020) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see Jonathan Cross, Christopher Boyd, Brittany
Crosby-Banyai & Christopher Milazzo, Recent Trends in Secondary Sanctions, HERBERT SMITH
FREEHILLS (Oct. 7, 2020), https://hsfnotes.com/sanctions/2020/10/07/recent-trends-in-secondarysanctions/ [https://perma.cc/W6M8-NF9L].
86. U.S. Department of State, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-s-departmentof-state [https://perma.cc/YV46-J3UH].
87. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DEP’T OF COM., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN BUSINESS ADVISORY: RISKS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR BUSINESSES WITH
SUPPLY CHAIN EXPOSURE TO ENTITIES ENGAGED IN FORCED LABOR AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN XINJIANG (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20200701_
xinjiang_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RX2-FDPW] [hereinafter 2020 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN
ADVISORY]; see Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Department of State Imposes Visa
Restrictions on Chinese Officials for Repression in Xinjiang, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-officials-forrepression-in-xinjiang/ [https://perma.cc/92DV-2ZU3]; see also Jordan Fabian, Trump Signs Bill That
Could Remove Chinese Stocks from U.S., BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-18/trump-signs-bill-that-could-remove-chinastock-listings-in-u-s [https://perma.cc/6KKQ-M8YW] (“[T]he law . . . limit[s] travel visas for 92
million Communist Party members. Any of them with a 10-year visa . . . now see it reduced to one
month.”).
88. See, e.g., Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, CBP’s Continued Enforcement Actions to
Combat Forced Labor in China, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.state.gov/cbpscontinued-enforcement-actions-to-combat-forced-labor-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/56WX-CQUQ]
(“[T]he world will not stand for the PRC’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs and members of other
Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang . . . .”); Jon Emont & William Mauldin, In Indonesia, Pompeo
Urges Muslims to Challenge China’s Xinjiang Policies, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-indonesia-pompeo-urges-muslims-to-challenge-chinas-xinjiangpolicies-11603970520 [https://perma.cc/33ZB-46MU] (quoting then-Secretary Pompeo in Indonesia)
(“[The CCP] has tried to convince Indonesians to look away from the torments your fellow Muslims
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the CCP’s heinous abuse of the human rights of its own citizens, affecting
countless families across the world.”89 Although the U.S. has already
denounced the atrocities in Xinjiang on a global platform,90 more
international diplomatic discourse that leads to global action is essential to
achieve the greatest success of all U.S. sanctions unilaterally and
multilaterally.91
Without legitimate action behind State Department efforts, the U.S.
cannot lead a global effort to stop China’s repression of the Uyghurs. For
example, at the world’s first Summit for Democracy,92 President Biden
addressed leaders of more than 100 countries reaffirming the shared
commitment to “push back on authoritarianism, fight corruption, promote
and protect human rights of people everywhere. To act. To act.”93 Yet, two
months later, the U.S. failed to act in its mission to “protect human rights
of people everywhere” in the decision to fund genocide by competing in
the Beijing Olympics. State Department leadership provides other nations
similar tools to join the U.S,94 but such leadership can only succeed when

are suffering. . . . CCP officials have spun fantastic tales . . . . Look at the facts, listen to . . . the
survivors and their families.”).
89. Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers in Xinjiang,
China, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 31, 2020), https://www.state.gov/on-sanctioning-human-rightsabusers-in-xinjiang-china/ [https://perma.cc/5KS4-WSVJ] (“The Trump Administration has led the
world’s effort to impose tangible costs on the PRC’s continuous campaign of repression, mass
arbitrary detention, intrusive surveillance, forced labor, forced population control, involuntary
collection of biometric data, and genetic analyses targeted at these groups.”).
90. See CONFLICT & STABILIZATION REPORT, supra note 33 (“U.S. publicly condemned China’s
ongoing and escalating abuses of the Uyghurs . . . at the 74th United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA), UN Security Council (UNSC) meetings, and various international commemorations.”);
Humeyra Pamuk & David Brunnstrom, U.S. Leads Condemnation of China for ‘Horrific’ Repression
of Muslims, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-un-xinjiang/u-sleads-condemnation-of-china-for-horrific-repression-of-muslims-idUSKBN1W92PX
[https://perma.cc/26KD-3M53] (“[US] led more than 30 countries in condemning . . . China’s
‘horrific campaign of repression’ against Muslims in Xinjiang . . . .”).
91. See generally Kieran Beer, Financial Crimes Matter: Sanctions of Our Time: Iran,
Venezuela and the Kingpins, ACAMS (Apr. 1, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (stating sanctions
require strong diplomacy efforts to work effectively).
92. See generally The Summit for Democracy, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/
summit-for-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/E37X-U2PS] (providing summary of proceedings and
schedule information).
93. Speeches and Remarks, Remarks By President Biden at the Summit for Democracy Opening
Session (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/12/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-summit-for-democracy-openingsession/ [https://perma.cc/YY6N-GU95].
94. Cf. Meagher, supra note 83, at 1014 (“[I]n 2012, Congress introduced legislation to
disconnect Iranian banks from the . . . financial messaging company that was used near universally for
global payments. Seeking to present a united front with the United States, the EU passed a similar
regulation shortly thereafter.”).
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it stands behind its mission to “defend human rights, combat corruption,
and promote accountability and good governance.”95
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a DHS agency, is
responsible for imposing Withhold Release Orders (WROs) to prevent
products made by forced labor from entering U.S. borders. Between 2019
and 2020, CBP imposed WROs “detaining imports of hair products
believed to have been manufactured with forced labor by two Chinese
companies operating in Xinjiang.”96 In Fiscal Year 2020 (October 2019 to
September 2020), CBP issued eight WROs on goods made by forced labor
in China.97 In Fiscal Year 2021 (October 2020 to September 2021), the
CBP has issued six WROs based on information indicating the use of
forced labor or human rights abuses in Xinjiang.98 One WRO99 of the six
issued in Fiscal Year 2021 for forced labor includes a ban on all cotton and
cotton products produced by the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps (XPCC).100 XPCC is a paramilitary entity and one of China’s singlelargest producers of cotton, accounting for about 37% of Xinjiang’s total
production in 2017.101 Another WRO banned “cotton products and tomato
products produced in Xinjiang . . . [encompassing] all products made in
whole or in part using this cotton or these tomatoes, regardless of where
95. Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, United States and Partners Promote Accountability for
Corruption and Human Rights Abuse, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.state.gov/
united-states-and-partners-promote-accountability-for-corruption-and-human-rights-abuse/
[https://perma.cc/2JMM-M8Q9].
96. 2020 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 87 (“[Including] a WRO detaining
imports of garments believed to have been produced with prison or forced labor by a Chinese company
operating in Xinjiang.”).
97. XPCC Detention Order, supra note 1; see Konnath, supra note 33 (stating CBP issued twelve
import bans, including eight for China in the last fiscal year).
98. Fact Sheet: New U.S. Government Actions on Forced Labor in Xinjiang, WHITE HOUSE
(June 24, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/factsheet-new-u-s-government-actions-on-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/ [https://perma.cc/25GX-EA93]
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]; see, e.g., CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products
Made by Slave Labor in Xinjiang, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-region-wide-withhold-releaseorder-products-made-slave [https://perma.cc/E3E6-HR3P] [hereinafter Slave Labor Withhold Release
Order].
99. XPCC Detention Order, supra note 1 (“The WRO on XPCC cotton products is the sixth
enforcement action that CBP has announced in the past three months [October–December] against
goods made by forced labor from China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”).
100. Id. (including “its subordinate and affiliated entities” and “any products that are made in
whole or in part with or derived from that cotton, such as apparel, garments, and textiles”).
101. FORCED LABOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6. (“XPCC helped build and run detention
facilities in its administrative areas that have been involved in the repression of Uyghurs. . . . These
activities mean that it is a key actor in what the U.S. Holocaust Museum has labeled crimes against
humanity.”).
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the downstream products are produced.”102 A subsequent WRO included
a ban on a company located in Xinjiang and its subsidiaries that make
silica-based products.103 In total, near the end of Fiscal Year 2021, CBP
issued WROs “against nine Chinese companies, XPCC cotton, and all
Xinjiang cotton and tomatoes as well as products using Xinjiang cotton or
tomatoes as inputs.”104 Overall, CBP has taken several actions to restrict
goods imported from Xinjiang.105 According to Ken Cuccinelli, former
DHS Deputy Secretary, “DHS is taking the lead to enforce our laws to
make sure human rights abusers, including U.S. businesses, are not
allowed to manipulate our system in order to profit from slave labor.”106
Cuccinelli further stated that “‘Made in China’ is not just a country of
origin[;] it is a warning label.”107
DHS’s unilateral actions are not enough to impact China’s
economy108 and to stop it from committing human rights abuses against
the Uyghur population. In 2019 alone, the U.S. imported roughly $11
billion in cotton textile and apparel products from China,109 and
approximately 84% of cotton from China is grown in Xinjiang.110 In 2020,
the U.S.’ largest supplier of good imports was China.111 Although Chinese
102. Slave Labor Withhold Release Order, supra note 98.
103. The Department of Homeland Security Issues Withhold Release Order on Silica-Based
Products Made by Forced Labor in Xinjiang, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (June 24, 2021),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/department-homeland-security-issueswithhold-release-order-silica [https://perma.cc/YD8S-JCWR].
104. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN BUSINESS ADVISORY: RISKS AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS WITH EXPOSURE TO ENTITIES ENGAGED IN
FORCED LABOR AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES LINKED TO XINJIANG, CHINA 10 (2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20210713_xinjiang_advisory_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6ZS-2SWU] [hereinafter 2021 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY].
105. See Sands & Westcott, supra note 51 (“It’s been the most aggressive year in using CBP’s
authorities to fight forced labor in its history that I know of.”).
106. XPCC Detention Order, supra note 1; see, e.g., Martha Mendoza, Hair Weaves from
Chinese Prison Camps Seized, AP NEWS (July 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/fff5fc7925f
09916bf6b9d5f79bb4132 [https://perma.cc/5TCX-FWCW] (reporting that CBP seized thirty tons of
products made from human hair suspected of being forcibly removed from Uyghurs imprisoned in
internment camps).
107. XPCC Detention Order, supra note 1.
108. See also David Laufman, Joseph Casino & Michael Kasdan, Where We Are in the US Trade
Secret Crackdown on China, LAW 360 (May 29, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1275219/
where-we-are-in-the-us-trade-secret-crackdown-on-china [https://perma.cc/9YW3-2DFA]. China is
the second largest economy in the world. Id.
109. US Bans Cotton Imports from China Producer, Citing ‘Slave Labour’, ALJAZEERA (Dec.
3, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/12/3/us-bans-cotton-imports-from-chinaproducer-citing-slave-labour [https://perma.cc/5M6U-9MMW].
110. Amy K. Lehr, Down the Rabbit Hole of Global Chains, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.
(Dec. 18, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify).
111. The People’s Republic of China: U.S.-China Trade Facts, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china
[https://perma.cc/6VC8-QXDA] [hereinafter U.S.-China Trade Facts].
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imports to the U.S. are statistically low on a global comparison,112 China
is the U.S.’ largest goods trading partner.113 Consequently, there is a
concerning probability that the billions of dollars from the cotton-made
and apparel products imported to the U.S. involved forced labor. 114 Thus,
the WROs are not enough to discourage China’s use of forced labor—
falling short in achieving its policy objective: to prevent trade with actors
committing human rights violations.115
3. U.S. Department of Commerce
The DOC focuses its efforts on prohibiting the export of U.S. goods
or services to entities known to profit from forced labor.116 The Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) of DOC maintains two lists: the Denied
Persons List and the Entity List (Commerce Entity List).117 The Denied
Persons List designations are concerned with export and reexport
privileges.118 The Commerce Entity List designations are concerned with
export licensing to designated entities.119 Ultimately, the designations
result in the parties facing new restrictions on access to U.S. goods and
technology.120
BIS responded to the Xinjiang situation by imposing sanctions on
entities involved in cultural genocide. It added the following entities to the
Commerce Entity List due to evidence of crimes committed against
humanity or enabling human rights abuses in Xinjiang: in 2019, eight
Chinese commercial entities and twenty Chinese governmental entities;121
in 2020, the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security’s Institute of Forensic
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. See id. (stating cotton is not immediately exported from China but is turned into cotton yarn,
fabric, and garments through internal supply chains that make it difficult to trace the cotton origin).
115. See infra Section III.B.
116. See Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://www.commerce.gov/
bureaus-and-offices/bis [https://perma.cc/QFM5-AKN4].
117. See Frequently Asked Questions: Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) and the SDN List,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/faqs/topic/1631/print [https://perma.cc/8HZ5-ZQBK] (“[BIS] maintains separate lists for
the purposes of the programs that it administers (including the Denied Persons List and the Entity
List). The Denied Persons List consists of individuals and companies that have been denied export
and reexport privileges by BIS. The Entity List consists of foreign end users who pose an unacceptable
risk of diverting U.S. exports and the technology they contain to alternate destinations for the
development of weapons of mass destruction.”).
118. See id. (discussing difference between DOC and OFAC lists).
119. Id.
120. 2020 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 87.
121. Id. at 3 (“[I]ncluding the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, [seventeen] local public security
bureaus, Xinjiang Police College, and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Security
Bureau. . . . These Entity List additions imposed additional license requirements on exports, reexports,
and transfers (in-country) to the [twenty-eight] listed entities.”).
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Science and eight Chinese companies,122 and fifteen additional Chinese
entities;123 in 2021, five other Chinese entities involved in the production
of polysilicon;124 and an additional fourteen entities based in the PRC.125
As a result, these designations restrict access to U.S. goods and technology
as it bans U.S. firms from selling goods to those entities.126 Although the
imposed primary sanctions send a strong message against human rights
violations in Xinjiang, the unilateral actions have done little to alter
China’s behavior.127
4. U.S. Department of Treasury
The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has
designated sanctions on numerous entities and persons.128 OFAC
maintains a separate list known as the Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List (OFAC Entity List). 129 The OFAC Entity List uses “the
122. 2020 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 87.
123. Press Release, Wilbur Russ, Sec’y of Com., Commerce Department Adds Eleven Chinese
Entities Implicated in Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang to the Entity List, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (July
20, 2020), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/07/commerce-department-addseleven-chinese-entities-implicated-human [https://perma.cc/R9VK-H4L8] (imposing sanctions for
eleven entities’ implications in “mass arbitrary detention, forced labor, involuntary collection of
biometric data, and genetic analyses targeted at Muslim minority groups” from Xinjiang); Michael R.
Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on People’s Republic of China Actors Linked to
Malign Activities, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.state.gov/u-s-imposes-newsanctions-on-peoples-republic-of-china-actors-linked-to-malign-activities/ [https://perma.cc/FJG87RJS] (adding fifty-nine PRC entities to Commerce Entity List for “exploiting U.S. goods and
technologies for malign purposes” and “enabling human rights abuses within China by providing
DNA-testing materials or high-technology surveillance equipment to the PRC government”).
124. Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of Com., Commerce Department Adds Five Chinese Entities
to the Entity List for Participating in China’s Campaign of Forced Labor Against Muslims in Xinjiang,
(June 24, 2021), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/06/commerce-departmentadds-five-chinese-entities-entity-list [https://perma.cc/WJB8-V948].
125. Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of Com., Commerce Department Adds 34 Entities to the
Entity List to Target Enablers of China’s Human Rights Abuses and Military Modernization, and
Unauthorized Iranian and Russian Procurement, (July 9, 2021), https://www.commerce.gov/news/
press-releases/2021/07/commerce-department-adds-34-entities-entity-list-target-enablers-chinas
[https://perma.cc/24FB-TYLG] (“[The fourteen entities] are based in the . . . [PRC] and have enabled
Beijing’s campaign of repression, mass detention, and high-technology surveillance against
Uyghurs, . . . and members of other Muslim minority groups in the . . . [XUAR], where the PRC
continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.”).
126. See China Geopolitics: South China Morning Post, Exposing American Investment in
Xinjiang; Beijing’s New Ambassador to the U.S. (June 25, 2021) (downloaded using Spotify)
[hereinafter Exposing American Investment in Xinjiang].
127. See infra Section III.B.
128. See generally Financial Sanctions: Office of Foreign Assets Control - Sanctions Programs
and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-offoreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-and-information [https://perma.cc/BRZ8-ESN5]
(providing OFAC Sanctions Lists).
129. See generally Office of Foreign Assets Control - Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-
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blocking of assets and trade restrictions on individuals and entities”
throughout the world to accomplish foreign policy goals.130 It also
prohibits U.S. persons from “engaging in any transactions with SDNs and
must block any property in their possession or under their control in which
an SDN has an interest.”131 In July 2020, OFAC sanctioned a few Chinese
government entities132 and several current or former government
officials133 pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order
13818,134 which “builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act.”135 These designations are for their
“connection to the serious human rights abuse against ethnic minorities,”
including the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.136
These unilateral efforts prohibit U.S. companies from engaging in
certain transactions with these entities, but it does not prevent U.S.
companies from investing in them. For example, three of the biggest
mutual fund companies have invested in Xinjiang companies despite these
sanctions.137 Consequently, they are flowing millions of dollars into the
sanctions-programs-and-information [https://perma.cc/BRZ8-ESN5] (“[The] Treasury administers
and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals
against targeted foreign countries and regimes . . . [and] those engaged in activities related to . . . other
threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”).
130. Sanctions Programs and Country Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-countryinformation [https://perma.cc/DAD5-UAN6]
131. Frequently Asked Questions: Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) and the SDN List,
supra note 117.
132. E.g., Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 31, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073 [https://perma.cc/3YSW-AVAM] [hereinafter
OFAC July 31, 2020 Sanctions]; Press Release, Statement on Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity &
Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (July 9, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1055
[https://perma.cc/QJ4K-C8QD] (including XPCC and Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB)
entities) [hereinafter OFAC July 9, 2020 Sanctions].
133. E.g., OFAC July 31, 2020 Sanctions, supra note 132; OFAC July 9, 2020 Sanctions, supra
note 132 (including a CCP Secretary of XUAR; former Deputy Party Secretary of the XUAR; current
Director and CCP Secretary of XPSB; former Party Secretary of the XPSB; former Political
Commissar of the XPCC, and the Deputy Party Secretary and Commander of the XPCC).
134. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 31 C.F.R. pt. 583.
135. OFAC July 31, 2020 Sanctions, supra note 132; OFAC July 9, 2020 Sanctions, supra note
132 (“[DOC] added nine PRC entities related to human rights abuses in the Xinjiang region to the
Commerce Entity List; this action complemented the October 2019 addition to the Commerce Entity
List of 28 entities engaged in the PRC repression campaign in the Xinjiang region.”).
136. OFAC July 9, 2020 Sanctions, supra note 132.
137. Exposing American Investment in Xinjiang, supra note 126; e.g., Jacob Fromer & Cissy
Zhou, In Windfall for Xinjiang, Huge US Mutual Funds Invest Millions in its Companies, US-CHINA
RELATIONS, (June 25, 2021) (“[T]hese three mutual fund companies [Vanguard, State Street, and
BlackRock], the biggest in the US and trusted by many Americans to manage their savings and
pensions, have collectively poured millions of dollars into Xinjiang’s publicly traded companies in
recent years, many of them directly controlled by the Xinjiang government itself.”).
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Xinjiang economy despite these sanctions and compliance guidance.138
“Vanguard has seen the value of its Xinjiang investments triple since 2018,
according to US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.”139
To prevent U.S. companies from supporting the CCP regime against the
Uyghurs, the U.S. should impose secondary sanctions regarding
transactions and investments tied to the specific human rights abuses in
Xinjiang.140
5. U.S. Department of Labor
The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) of the U.S.
Department of Labor maintains a list of goods produced by child labor or
forced labor.141 The purpose behind this list is to alert businesses of abuses
in their supply chain and provide tools for compliance and preventive
measures for companies and governments around the world.142 The list “is
not intended to be punitive, but rather to serve as a catalyst for more
strategic and focused coordination and collaboration among those working
to address these problems.”143 ILAB publishes a Federal Registrar Notice
with an updated list every two years.144 However, in June 2021, ILAB
added polysilicon145 produced with forced labor in the PRC to its list for
violating international standards.146 This addition is the first time a good
has been added to the list outside the two-year cycle.147 The 2020 List of
Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor Report “currently
138. Exposing American Investment in Xinjiang, supra note 126; see e.g., Posner, supra note 26
(“In 2018, SenseTime a $7.5 billion Chinese company, that makes facial-recognition technology,
raised $620 million in the U.S., assisted by Silver Lake, Tiger Global and other U.S. investment firms.
The company was added to the Commerce Department’s Entity List in 2019 because it provides
surveillance technology to the Chinese government that is being used in Xinjiang.”).
139. Jacob Fromer & Cissy Zhou, supra note 137.
140. See infra Section III.B.
141. See List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-products [https://perma.cc/8B7WWB7U].
142. DEP’T OF LAB., 2020 LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 9
(2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_
TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK5Y-Z6NN].
143. List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods [https://perma.cc/ZPQ4-TTBW].
144. Fact Sheet, supra note 98.
145. See generally, Kenneth Rapoza, Biden Takes a Shot Against China’s Massive Solar
Industry. Why It Matters., FORBES (June 27, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/
2021/06/27/biden-takes-a-shot-against-chinas-massive-solar-industry-why-it-matters/?sh=
3828dcf947ba [https://perma.cc/FX7F-38EX] (“Estimates are that China controls around half of the
global polysilicon supply chain of which roughly 60% is based in Xinjiang. Since China does not
allow third party audits, it is also hard to know if any of the solar cells being exported to the U.S. were
made by Hoshine [a company issued a WRO] materials.”).
146. Fact Sheet, supra note 98.
147. Id.
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includes other products from the PRC that have links to forced labor in
Xinjiang or by Uyghur workers transferred to other parts of the PRC,
including cotton, garments, footwear, electronics, gloves, hair products,
textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products.”148 This acknowledgement is
essential but it stops short of tangible legal ramifications because ILAB
has no authority to reprimand the bad actors.
The current restrictions and sanctions against China and entities
involved in the human rights violations imposed by the federal agencies
are not enough. The following Part suggests how the U.S. can do more to
impact China’s trade forum and ultimately end the cultural genocide.
III. TIME TO PRESSURE CHINA
To end cultural genocide and change China’s forced labor practices
and regime in Xinjiang, the U.S. must impact China’s trade forum. The
U.S. can lead this effort by (1) engaging in stronger international
coordination efforts and enforcing multilateral measures against China;
and (2) imposing secondary sanctions against any entity or person
assisting, investing, sourcing, supplying, or aiding in human rights abuses
in Xinjiang.
A. Multilateral Efforts
First, the U.S. should discuss the Xinjiang situation and its
sanctioning strategies on a world platform. It should focus on creating a
collegial framework and avoid possible disconnect and harm to allies.149
A multilateral strategy will likely stir international support and create
political pressure for other democracies to take action.150
1. The World Platform
The U.S. must lead a global effort to end cultural genocide occurring
in Xinjiang through stronger multilateral diplomacy efforts. The U.S. is a
148. Id. See generally 2021 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 104 (“To date, the
Department of Labor has identified 18 goods produced by forced labor in China, including six goods
on the TVPRA [Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act] List that are produced by forced
labor by members of Muslim minority groups, including Uyghurs . . . and members of other ethnic
and Muslim minority groups, in Xinjiang.”).
149. See generally Beer, supra note 91 (discussing how U.S. sanction framework can hurt allies
if they are not on the same page).
150. See generally Todd F. Buchwald & Adam Keith, SIMON-SKJODT CTR. FOR THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, By Any Other Name: How, When, and Why the US Government Has Made
Genocide Determinations (2019) (“The international community has a responsibility ‘to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.’ . . . . More generally, US policy
statements on atrocity prevention . . . serve as sources of pressure to act when there is a clear risk of
genocide . . . .”).
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powerful world leader;151 it is “the world’s largest national economy and
leading global trader.”152 As a result, it has the strength to lead a more
diplomatic and multilateral dialogue. A multilateral strategy encourages
other nations to implement similar standards for business entities involved
in Xinjiang trade. Ultimately, it establishes a framework for multinationalsupplier labor standards and simultaneously pressures China to change its
regime against the Uyghur people.153
Specifically, the U.S. can raise more awareness through avenues
such as the World Economic Forum and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). During the multilateral discussions, the U.S. must press for reform
against China’s “bully tactics”154 and continuously make Xinjiang the
forefront topic.155 Moreover, the U.S. can lead in a multilateral
coordination effort, such as in Central America and Southeast Asia, to
develop new sourcing hubs that comply with the Magnitsky Act, providing
a foundation for capitalizing on future economic growth in those regions.
The tactic to diversify, to source from other regions, in compliance with
the Magnitsky Act is a strategic method because it provides an alternate
supply chain with humane standards.156 The U.S. can work closely with its
allies, such as the EU157 and Trans-Pacific Partnership158 nations, to

151. Sinéad Baker, The Most Powerful Countries on Earth in 2020, Ranked, BUS. INSIDER (Jan.
19, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-most-powerful-countries-2020-ranked-us-news2020-1 [https://perma.cc/3E6A-NU3G] (ranking U.S. as “the world’s most-powerful country in
2020”).
152. Economy & Trade, supra note 2.
153. See, e.g., Combatting Human Rights Abuses, supra note 2.
154. See Beijing’s Genocide Olympics, supra note 76 (“[This is] a very complex problem, which
is this Chinese communist party that acts like a mafia organization and runs the biggest richest
economy in the world and is committing a genocide on our watch.”).
155. Cf. id. (suggesting a similar approach to the Reagan administration’s approach to the Soviet
Union during the Cold War era that made “significant headway on human rights issues” by making it
the initial topic of every meeting and trade talk).
156. See AMY K. LEHR & HENRY C. Wu, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., ADDRESSING
FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION 9 (2021) https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210203_Lehr_Labor_XUAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KQ4F-GVKK] (suggesting diversifying sourcing locations and developing new
sourcing hubs may be complementary to the UN Sustainable Development Goals by spurring
economic development).
157. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks of Sec’y Lew on the
Evolution of Sanctions and Lessons for the Future at the Carnegie Endowment for Inter’l Peace, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/pages/jl0398.aspx [https://perma.cc/7VBV-BELE] [hereinafter Evolution of Sanctions]
(“[W]e have learned that sanctions are most effective at changing behavior when we work closely with
our partners to build support for a common objective. The more international support there is for
sanctions, and for their underlying objective, the more effective they will be.”).
158. See Yun Jiang & Jordan Schneider, The United States Needs More Wine to Stand Up to
Chinese Bullying, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 10, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/10/unitedstates-australian-wine-chinese-bullying-strategic-shiraz-
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diversify and develop a strategy to source from other regions and prevent
Xinjiang-made products from entering their borders.
In addition to allies supporting each other’s objectives, the U.S. can
incentivize other nations that are closely tied to China’s economy and
depending on Xinjiang products.159 For example, the U.S. can negotiate
monetary rewards, loans, or grants to limit other nations from importing
Xinjiang-linked products and transactions connected to forced labor.160 As
a result, the nations that depend on China can rely less on China’s trade as
the U.S. provides a more adaptable economic framework.
However, it is important not to neglect China’s powerful role in the
world economy.161 Although such avenues may take substantial time,
multilateral engagement can encourage nations to ally with the U.S. to
provide a framework that combats forced labor in Xinjiang. The
multilateral engagements would limit transactions with entities connected
to forced labor in Xinjiang and create global sanctions resulting in
substantial economic risks for China. Additionally, this mechanism
promotes other nations and multilateral institutions to support human
rights organizations that help suppressed Xinjiang people in which may
likewise pressure China to release more detainees.162 Therefore, in
addition to a harsher sanction scheme,163 the U.S. must create action on the
global stage through stronger multilateral mechanisms.
2. U.S.–EU Coordination
A combined U.S.–EU framework would send a strong message to
China to provoke change. Although in the spring of 2021, the EU, as well
as Canada and the United Kingdom, imposed targeted sanctions on

reserve/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=28301&utm_term=Flashpoints
%20OC&?tpcc=28301 [https://perma.cc/9W9E-GEAC].
159. See generally Preston Jordan Lim, Applying International Law Solutions to the Xinjiang
Crisis, 22 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 90, 92 (2021) (“Given China’s status as an economic powerhouse,
only a few countries have proven willing to risk Chinese wrath by condemning Chinese human rights
abuses.”).
160. See generally Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Euijin Jung, What’s New in Economic Sanctions?,
130 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2020) (discussing monetary rewards as a positive measure to incentivize
other nations).
161. See Laufman, Casino & Kasdan, supra note 108 (stating that China is the second largest
economy globally). But see Luke Patey, China Is an Economic Bully—and Weaker Than it Looks,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 4, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/04/china-is-an-economic-bullyand-weaker-than-it-looks/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=29013
&utm_term=Flashpoints%20OC&?tpcc=29013 [https://perma.cc/V5MU-NNZF].
162. See e.g., CONNECTING THE DOTS, supra note 7, at 21–26 (reporting a first-hand story of a
detained Uyghur woman who was eventually released with help from a human rights organization).
163. See infra Section III.B.
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Chinese officials,164 the unilateral sanctions against China’s robust
economy are not enough. When President Obama led the U.S.-EU
coordination and cooperation (2014 cooperation),165 he stated such
measures would “have an even bigger bite” than U.S. sanctions alone,166
and that would be the case here. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014,
the U.S. and EU allied together in the 2014 cooperation effort that led to
“imposing sanctions on Russia and coordination on other political and
diplomatic responses to Russia’s invasion.”167 The 2014 cooperation
stands as a “tangible indication of U.S.–European solidarity frustrating
Russian efforts to drive a wedge between transatlantic partners.”168
Moreover, the 2014 cooperation “sought to close as many gaps as possible
between the two sanction regimes to send a unified message to Russia,
maximize the effectiveness of sanctions, and make compliance for
financial firms and multinational companies easier.”169
Regardless of immediate effect, the “sanctions have led the Russian
government to make policy adjustments, including diverting resources to
affected businesses and sectors.”170 Despite pushback that the Russian
sanctions did not achieve their objective,171 the broad deterrent

164. Wendy Wysong, Ali Burney & Nicholas Turner, Sanctions and Export Controls in the AsiaPacific Region, GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (July 31, 2021),
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-guide-sanctions/second-edition/article/sanctionsand-export-controls-in-the-asia-pacific-region [https://perma.cc/6FM9-ZWF4].
165. The actions that the U.S. has taken in response to 2022 Russian-Ukraine war is beyond the
scope of this Note.
166. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R4515, U.S. SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA 39 (2020) [hereinafter U.S.
SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA].
167. Id. at 38. (“The Obama Administration and the EU designed sanctions related to Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, in part, to impose longer-term pressures on Russia’s economy while minimizing
collateral damage to the Russian people and to the economic interests of the countries imposing
sanctions.”).
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 39.
170. Id. at 55 (“[U.S.] imposed sanctions on Rusal, a global aluminum firm, which had broad
effects that rattled Russian and global financial markets. These sanctions marked the first time the
United States had made a top-twenty Russian firm completely off-limits, and the first time the Treasury
Department appeared prepared to implement CRIEEA-mandated secondary sanctions. In January
2019, however, the Treasury Department removed sanctions on Rusal and two related companies after
Kremlin connected billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who is subject to sanctions, agreed to relinquish his
control over the three firms.”); see also Beer, supra note 91 (stating U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia
impacted Russia’s central bank reserves to fall at precipitates rates).
171. See, e.g., Sanctions Against Russia Have Failed to Achieve Political Goals, NPR (Aug. 30,
2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/08/30/344585043/sanctions-against-russia-have-failed-to-achievepolitical-goals [https://perma.cc/9KL6-DJ6V] (“[C]urrent sanctions [against Russia], which have been
primarily economic, are definitely having an impact on the Russian economy. But so far, they’ve failed
to achieve their political goal, which is to get Vladimir Putin to shift his policy course towards
Ukraine.”).
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implications seriously complicated Russia’s ability to achieve its
objectives172—and for that, this metric has succeeded.
Similarly, a U.S.-EU coalition could restrain China’s economy due
to its force as transnational partners. Like the 2014 cooperation, the U.S.
should apply a framework that targets entities to adjust their behavior and
pressures multilateral entities to adjust their operational procedures. With
the current U.S. Administration, a U.S.–EU coalition is feasible and can
force change in Xinjiang. The current EU position on China173 resembles
the Administration’s policy during the 2014 cooperation.174 With the
current Administration in the White House, the ability to coordinate with
the EU is achievable and in both nations’ interest.175 A U.S.–EU coalition
is a strong and effective framework to initiate serious change to the trade
practices in Xinjiang.
B. Secondary Sanctions
Second, OFAC should impose secondary sanctions176 on entities
involved in the forced labor practices that fund this cultural genocide.
Although the federal agencies’ actions economically burden persons and
entities involved in the human rights abuses and lower the possibility that
U.S. trade supports the Xinjiang genocide,177 these unilateral efforts fall
short of initiating substantial change to China’s regime.
While secondary sanctions may seem like a dramatic step because
they target non–U.S. persons, this tactic can stimulate reform in Xinjiang

172. See Erielle Davidson, Sanctions, Sanctions, Sanctions, NAT’L SEC. DIG. (Dec. 23, 2020)
(downloaded using Spotify) (discussing adverse impact on Russian objectives in result of U.S.
sanctions on Russia).
173. Lyubov Pronina, China Deserves New Sanctions Over Xinjiang, EU Lawmakers Say,
BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-09/china-deservesnew-sanctions-over-xinjiang-eu-parliament-says#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/5JLV-PCBY].
174. Keith Johnson, How Europe Fell out of Love with China, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 25, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/25/china-europe-rival-strategic-competitor-huawei/
[https://perma.cc/KPT6-ZDKA] (“For years, much as the United States did in the past, Europe has
sought to nudge China to make reforms in how it trades and does business but has nothing to show for
it. Now, European officials openly talk of China as a rival that needs to start making changes—or face
increasing restrictions from Beijing’s biggest trading partner.”).
175. See, e.g., Homi Kharas & Dennis J. Snower, The Future of Multilateralism: Global
Governance in a Changing World, 5 GLOB. SOLS. J. 54, 82 (2020) (“Multilateral coordination
generates win-win opportunities for all nations.”).
176. Also known as supplementary sanctions.
177. Cf. Nicholas Rowan, Uighur Protections Bill Passes House Amid Partisan Division on
China Policy, WASH. EXAM’R (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/uighurprotections-bill-passes-house-amid-partisan-division-on-china-policy [https://perma.cc/FTN2-S38V]
(“[S]anctioning is the most effective way to hold these human rights abusers accountable.”).
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with multilateral alignment of foreign policy.178 Secondary sanctions
pressure entities worldwide to consider the likely financial, legal, and
reputational risks of doing business connected to human rights
violations.179 These sanctions “target third–party actors doing business
with, supporting, or facilitating targeted regimes, persons, and
organizations.”180 In other words, secondary sanctions are imposed against
non–U.S. persons that conduct transactions with entities or persons on the
OFAC Entity List. Essentially, these sanctions differ in that “they are not
directed toward the primary target, but rather are directed against third
parties in an attempt to [change] their behavior or their policies regarding
the primary target.”181 In recent years, as a means to achieve important
U.S. foreign policy goals, the U.S. has increasingly relied on sanctions.182
Secondary sanctions are controversial because they impact third
parties and can financially burden other nations not directly linked to the
designated entity.183 The U.S. recognizes that sanctions should be used
with caution because they “can strain diplomatic relationships, introduce
instability into the global economy, and impose real costs on companies
here and abroad. And . . . carry a risk of retaliation.”184 However,
sanctions are appropriate when (1) a “significant threat” to national
security, foreign policy, or the economy is present; and (2) the U.S. has
“reasonable confidence that they will achieve their intended policy goal,
and only when the balance of costs and benefits is in our [the U.S.’]
favor.”185 In this case, primary sanctions fail to combat cultural genocide
with millions of people subjected to forced labor and heinous conditions
in an economically powerful and coercive country.

178. Cf. Meagher, supra note 83, at 1013–14 (discussing U.S.’ imposition of secondary sanctions
against Iran’s energy sector was impactful in “large part[] due to the multilateral nature of the
sanctions” and the alignment of the “respective foreign policies on either side of the Atlantic”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 1006–07.
180. GAO REPORT, supra note 85, at 5.
181. GEORGE E. SHAMBAUGH, STATES, FIRMS, AND POWER: SUCCESSFUL SANCTIONS IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1999).
182. See GAO REPORT, supra note 85; see also Jonathan Cross, Christopher Boyd, Brittany
Crosby-Banyai & Christopher Milazzo, Recent Trends in Secondary Sanctions, HERBERT SMITH
FREEHILLS (Oct. 7, 2020), https://hsfnotes.com/sanctions/2020/10/07/recent-trends-in-secondarysanctions/ [https://perma.cc/7GET-RC8G].
183. See also ELLIE GERANMAYEH & MANUEL LAFONT RAPNOUIL, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS 1 (2019) (arguing secondary sanctions
have become “a critical challenge for Europe” because of their “aggressive economic statecraft”).
184. Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 157.
185. Id.
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Imposing secondary sanctions is a stronger mechanism than the
current U.S. strategy186 that can “become a powerful force in service of
clear and coordinated foreign policy objectives.”187 A crucial reason
secondary sanctions reach beyond primary sanctions is because third
parties that conduct business with sanctioned entities often face “severe
financial penalties and threats of exclusion from U.S. consumer and
financial markets.”188 Therefore, imposing secondary sanctions places
immense pressure on multinational companies to weigh the benefits of
conducting business in Xinjiang against the threat of being excluded from
the U.S. market, which brings grave consequences. For example, “most
large multinational companies cannot afford to lose access to the US
market” and regardless of company size, each face the risk of being labeled
as a company that violated sanctions—effectively tarnishing its reputation
and business.189
In addition, businesses risk being excluded from the global banking
system.190 For instance, when the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on
Iranian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, other global banks complied.191
This method discourages non–U.S. persons from conducting transactions
with Chinese entities and persons listed on OFAC’s Entity List and other
sanctionable transactions.
In this case, the world is witnessing cultural genocide, and the U.S.
economy is funding it. Not only are primary sanctions justified, but
secondary sanctions are likewise appropriate.192 For example, the U.S.
enacted the Hong Kong Autonomy Act,193 and pursuant to Section 5 of the
Act, any Foreign Financial Institute (FFI) could be subject to secondary

186. See Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 157 (“Economic sanctions have become a powerful
force in service of clear and coordinated foreign policy objectives—smart power for situations where
diplomacy alone is insufficient, but military force is not the right response.”).
187. Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 157.
188. Meagher, supra note 83, at 999.
189. Robert Lewis, US Secondary Sanctions Provoke Strong Backlash Among Both Friends and
Foes Around the World, LEXOLOGY (July 21, 2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=84f1f477-ad07-4063-9964-c6a030779bb7 [https://perma.cc/447X-W9CX].
190. Id. (“[A]n aggressive US administration theoretically could still use its sanctions power to
cut off access to the US dominated financial systems, which could still severely handicap global banks
and MNCs [multinational companies] even in a world with redundant alternative global payment
systems and competing currencies.”).
191. Id. (“When the US . . . barred Iranian banks from the SWIFT network, Belgium-based
SWIFT complied and the EU acquiesced.”).
192. Cf. Evolution of Sanctions, supra note 157 (“And secondary sanctions should be used only
in the most exceptional circumstances, where—as with Iran—the threat is severe, where we have
international consensus, and when ordinary sanctions have fallen short of their mark.”).
193. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 633 (2020).
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sanctions.194 In result, Chinese state–owned banks were unwilling to open
an account for a Chinese governmental official who was carrying out
Chinese government policy, prohibited by the U.S. sanctions.195 In regard
to pressuring non–U.S. entities to support the U.S.’ objective to end human
right abuses, secondary sanctions are an effective tactic to weaken China’s
regime, in part due to respect and fear of U.S. secondary sanctions.
1. Maximum Pressure Campaign
The U.S. secondary sanctions against Iran, part of the “Maximum
Pressure Campaign,” are a dramatic yet significant example of the U.S.
imposing effective secondary sanctions.196 However, it is important to
distinguish the secondary sanctions recommended in this Note from the
combined Iranian comprehensive sanctions197 and Iranian governmental
priorities that have negatively impacted and severely harmed the Iranian
people.198 Thus, this Note highlights the effectiveness of the secondary
sanctions—not the comprehensive sanctions—and does not recommend
comprehensive sanctions against China. Nevertheless, in regard to the
Iranian secondary sanctions, the Treasury imposed secondary sanctions
against thirteen individuals and twelve entities for their connection in
support of Iran’s ballistic missile program and Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.199 Accordingly, in part due to these secondary
sanctions, they effectively denied revenue and minimized the amount of
money available to the Iranian government.200 For example, Executive
Order (E.O.) 13902201 expanded U.S. secondary sanctions against Iran to

194. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 5(B) OF THE HONG KONG
AUTONOMY ACT (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/hkaa_report_12112020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YZ8-S3AH].
195. Davidson, supra note 172.
196. See Advancing the U.S. Maximum Pressure Campaign on Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr.
22, 2019), https://www.state.gov/advancing-the-u-s-maximum-pressure-campaign-on-iran/
[https://perma.cc/9C5V-F8PW].
197. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 85, at 4 (“Comprehensive sanctions generally
include broad-based trade restrictions and prohibit commercial activity with an entire country.
Examples of comprehensive sanctions include U.S. sanctions against Iran and Cuba.”).
198. See Beer, supra note 91 (discussing Iranian regime exploiting humanitarian efforts, i.e.,
government managed to make a billion dollars in medical supplies disappear and spent $170,000 for
medical supplies on tobacco).
199. GAO REPORT, supra note 85, at 5.
200. See Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, The Importance of Sanctions on Iran, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.state.gov/the-importance-of-sanctions-on-iran/
[https://perma.cc/HH9E-LPN4] [hereinafter Importance of Sanctions on Iran] (“Since May 2018, we
[U.S.] have denied the [Iran’s] regime of direct access to more than $70 billion in oil revenue, and will
continue to prevent the regime access to around $50 billion annually . . . . These sanctions deprive the
regime of funds it would use to carry out its malign activities.”).
201. Exec. Order No. 13902, 85 Fed. Reg. 2003 (Jan. 14, 2020).
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include certain types of transactions.202 The secondary sanctions are
summarized as follows:
The secondary sanctions in E.O. 13902 mean that OFAC may
sanction non-U.S. individuals and entities if they operate in or
knowingly engage in a “significant” transaction for the sale or supply
to or from Iran of “significant” goods or services “used in connection
with” the Iranian construction, mining, manufacturing, or textiles
sectors. E.O. 13902 also authorizes the Treasury Secretary
via OFAC to sanction non-U.S. financial institutions that facilitate
“significant” financial transactions involving those sectors.203

The E.O.’s objective was “to deny the Iranian government revenues,
including revenues derived from the export of products from key sectors
of Iran’s economy, that may be used to fund and support its nuclear
program, missile development, terrorism and terrorist proxy networks, and
malign regional influence.”204 Almost a year after imposing these
secondary sanctions, coupled with other sanctions and factors, the “Iranian
rial has depreciated to one fifth of its former value against the dollar since
the start of the campaign, while Iran’s GDP has shrunk by around 6% for
three consecutive years.”205
Like the secondary sanctions imposed on Iran, the U.S. should
impose similar sanctions to non–U.S. entities and persons that conduct
transactions or investments with any sanctioned entity relating to Xinjiang
violations. Similar to the goal put forth under the Iranian sanctions, the
objective to impose secondary sanctions against entities involved in
Xinjiang human rights abuses sends a strong message to the world: Despite
China’s dominance in the economy, the U.S. is committed to ending
modern genocide.
2. Secondary Sanction Effects
Secondary sanctions are intended to promote accountability to
entities and the CCP for their involvement in human rights violations that
ultimately fund cultural genocide.206 The secondary sanctions are not
intended to harm people. The secondary sanctions imposed against
202. OFAC Issues New FAQs Clarifying Iran Sanctions, MORRISON FOERSTER (June 18, 2020),
https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200618-ofac-new-faqs-iran-sanctions.html
[https://perma.cc/P4ZL-RHCU] (including transactions involving construction, mining,
manufacturing, and textiles sectors).
203. Id.
204. Exec. Order No. 13902, 85 Fed. Reg. at 2003.
205. Importance of Sanctions on Iran, supra note 200.
206. See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 181, at 49 (“The U.S. government has used secondary
sanctions to compel negligent firms to alter their behavior.”).
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Syria207 were enforced as a means to “send a clear signal that no foreign
business should enter into business with or otherwise enrich such a
regime.”208
A similar objective should apply here. The objective of these
secondary sanctions should likewise send a clear message that no foreign
entity should engage in transactions or investments connected to the
Xinjiang abuses or otherwise enrich the PRC’s regime.
Although these sanctions present challenges in a complex supply
chain for multinational-businesses, banks, and third parties that may link
to designated parties,209 that hurdle210 cannot outweigh cultural genocide.
Every multinational-business has a choice. And such choice carries
the inevitable risk that a business’s supply chain connects to a Chinese
subsidiary on the OFAC Entity List, Commerce Entity List, or Denied
Persons List. Another risk to consider is that a business’s imports come
from Xinjiang or a neighboring province that has a potential connection to
human rights abuses. In July 2021, U.S. Secretary of Labor, Marty Walsh,
alerted businesses of the heightened risks involved in the supply chain and
investment links to the labor and human rights abuses against Uyghurs and
other minority groups in Xinjiang: “China[‘s], [abuses] are egregious,
systematic and ongoing . . . . Any company doing business in this region
should take heed: These are reprehensible and illegal practices, and the
goods produced under these conditions have no place in the U.S.
economy.”211
The U.S. government acknowledges a company’s burden to
investigate its complex supply chain and provides support as it imposes
more sanctions. For example, OFAC provided U.S. companies with an
economic sanction guideline212 on how to implement compliance policies
207. See 22 U.S.C. § 8791–95; see also Exec. Order No. 13894, 84 Fed. Reg. 55851 (Oct. 14,
2019).
208. Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 17, 2020),
https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/S7XR-C8L6].
209. See Ama Adams, Brendan Hanifin & Emerson Siegle, A Review of 2020’s Key US Sanctions
Developments, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1338652/a-review-of2020-s-key-us-sanctions-developments [https://perma.cc/A8P6-QPCB] (“These designations have
presented practical challenges for multinational businesses, including companies with long supply
chain networks . . . .”).
210. See generally Economist Radio, Unpicking the Thread: Forced Labour in Xinjiang, THE
ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (arguing American companies are being
asked to police a complex system that lacks diplomatic leadership).
211. U.S. Department of Labor, Other Federal Departments Issue Business Advisory for
Xinjiang, China, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (July 13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/
ilab/ilab20210713 [https://perma.cc/ZDS6-D3WG].
212. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FRAMEWORK FOR OFAC COMPLIANCE COMMITMENTS
(2019), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/framework_ofac_cc.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3285HDL].

2022]

"Made in China" Is a Warning Label

737

and regulations.213 Specifically, regarding the Xinjiang “genocide and
crimes against humanity,”214 several federal agencies215 released a
“Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory” in 2020 and 2021 discussing
the risks and considerations for businesses exposed to entities engaged in
the Xinjiang abuses.216 Although businesses carry the burden to investigate
its supply chain, the U.S. government is working to support companies to
combat forced labor.
Furthermore, such compliance is not an impossible task. The U.S.
should hold corporations that place monetary gain over human rights
abuses accountable. To illustrate, a few large retail companies, such as
Patagonia and H&M, took their own initiative to cut ties with Xinjiang’s
supply industry.217 Although some companies have risen to the
challenge,218 others have not. For example, “[d]espite universallyrecognized abuses occurring in Xinjiang,”219 Disney filmed its movie

213. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OFAC Issues a Framework for
Compliance Commitments (May 2, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm680
[https://perma.cc/8SDF-9N6B] (“As the United States continues to enhance our sanctions programs,
ensuring that the private sector implements strong and effective compliance programs that protect the
U.S. financial system from abuse is a key part of our strategy.”).
214. 2020 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 87.
215. Issued by the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce,
Department of Homeland Security, Office of the United States Trade Representative, and Department
of Labor. Id.
216. Id.; 2021 XINJIANG SUPPLY CHAIN ADVISORY, supra note 104.
217. E.g., Tessa Byars, Update: Patagonia Statement on Xinjiang, PATAGONIA WORKS (July 23,
2020), http://www.patagoniaworks.com/press/2020/7/23/update-patagonia-statement-on-xinjiang
[https://perma.cc/H6UX-T3NX] (prohibiting its global suppliers from using fiber made in Xinjiang
region); Sophie Richardson, China’s “Untenable Operating Environment” for Business in Xinjiang,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/25/chinas-untenableoperating-environment-business-xinjiang# [https://perma.cc/QQK6-8EAM] (cutting ties to an indirect
supplier due to forced labor concerns and discrimination of ethnoreligious minorities).
218. See, e.g., UK’s Marks and Spencer to Ban Xinjiang Cotton over Uighur ‘Abuses’, CNA
INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/uk-s-marks-and-spencerto-ban-xinjiang-cotton-over-uighur—abuses—13908184 [https://perma.cc/N249-V8AS] (reporting
UK’s Marks and Spencer “vowed . . . not to use [Xinjiang] cotton” and athlete Antoine Griezmann
“immediately terminate[d] his partnership’ with telecom giant Huawei due to ‘strong suspicions’” it
supports Chinese authorities’ surveillance of Uyghuir minority).
219. Juliegrace Brufke, GOP Lawmakers Want Answers from Disney on Mulan, China, THE
HILL (Sept. 14, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/516323-gop-lawmakers-want-answersfrom-disney-on-mulan-china [https://perma.cc/5AC2-55WQ]. Lawmakers from the House Oversight
and Reform Committee questioned Disney because it supported Georgia’s abortion rights but found it
legitimate to fund CCP’s human rights abuses. A letter addressed to Disney’s CEO from the House
Oversight and Reform Committee stated, “[p]erhaps more surprising than Disney’s decision to film
Mulan in Xinjiang is its recent contemplation to put a moratorium on all filming in the state of Georgia.
Disney appears to have taken a firm stand against the lives and rights of the unborn in favor of the
right of the CCP to commit genocide against the Uyghurs and force sterilizations on Uyghur women.”
Id.
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Mulan in Xinjiang.220 Disney also offered a “special thanks” to the CCP
government entities221 including “over a dozen Chinese institutions that
assisted with filming.”222 More recently, the Beijing Olympic sponsorships
illuminate why stronger action, such as secondary sanctions and
multilateral engagement, is essential to end the Xinjiang genocide:
These companies stood publicly for justice after George Floyd’s
murder and months of self-examination over race in America. But
with rare exception, when pressed by lawmakers on an issue far from
American shores in a country possessing a tantalizing bonanza of
customers, their bold stances for justice wilted with the wind.223

Corporations are picking and choosing when to stand for justice, and
when financial profit was at stake, they turned their heads. “Instead of
using their significant clout to speak boldly for human rights in China—
or, even stronger, speaking boldly and pulling up stakes entirely—the
corporate sponsors that underwrite the Games and use the Olympics as a
marketing tool are putting profit over morality.”224 Corporations should
not have the freedom to pick and choose when to fund genocide.
While the U.S. concurrently pursues primary sanctions and
multilateral engagement, secondary sanctions should be imposed.
Secondary sanctions place accountability on all entities involved—
directly or indirectly—in the Xinjiang cultural genocide.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. must stand behind its core democratic values and refuse to
engage in capitalism tainted with genocide. Seneca, the ancient stoic
philosopher, had credence in his prose: The U.S. can no longer engage in
China’s comprised administration; it can no longer fuel China’s sketchy
trade industry; and it can no longer support this notoriously bad state
entity. Simply put, “there can no longer be business as usual with
China.”225
220. Id. (“Disney’s decision to film Mulan in Xinjiang and use CCP-run entities is inapposite
and counters the company’s commitment to ‘provid[e] comfort, inspiration, and opportunity to
children and families around the world.’”).
221. E.g., id.; Lily Kuo, Disney Remake of Mulan Criticised for Filming in Xinjiang, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/sep/07/disney-remake-of-mulan-criticisedfor-filming-in-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/L962-Z9LC].
222. Juliegrace Brufke, supra note 219 (“Disney’s eagerness to partner with CCP groups
engaged in such atrocities while taking jobs out of the state of Georgia is disturbing.”).
223. Kurt Streeter, A Diplomatic Boycott is a Start. Sponsors Should Act Next., N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/sports/olympics/diplomatic-boycott-2022-winterolympics.html [https://perma.cc/3R4M-3G7B].
224. Id.
225. 166 CONG. REC. H4666 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2020) (statement of Congressman Michael
McCaul).
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A robust and coordinated sanctions framework can debilitate China’s
economy and seriously complicate China’s ability to commit human rights
violations. Coupled with stronger multilateral engagement, the U.S. can
lay the groundwork for global efforts to ensure that those responsible for
human rights abuses are held accountable. Although additional steps and
other complex factors must be considered before a change can occur,
especially due to China’s role in the economy and lack of transparency in
the supply chain, the above recommendations provide a powerful strategy
to combat the human rights violations and end cultural genocide in
Xinjiang.
The importance of human life must supersede economic interests. To
achieve U.S. policy objectives in protecting human rights, the U.S must
do more to stop China’s egregious actions. It demands stronger initiative
from the U.S to lead the global economy in ending cultural genocide
in Xinjiang—“it is the call of a siren.”226

226. DAILY STOIC, supra note 3.

